THE NEW MELTING POT:

Changing Faces of International Migration and Policy Implications for Southern California

GEORGES VERNEZ

OCTOBER 2003
MISSION STATEMENT:

The Pacific Council on International Policy aims to promote better understanding and more effective action, by private and public sector leaders alike, in addressing a rapidly changing world. It brings together leaders from diverse communities across the western United States and around the Pacific Rim. Its focus is the interaction of global trends and local effects as national borders become more porous, traditional concepts of “public” and “private” blur, and what constitutes “policy” itself is changing.

Dr. Georges Vernez is director of the RAND Center for Research on Immigration Policy. His research focuses on education, immigration, and social policy issues. He has directed and conducted studies on a broad range of immigration issues including a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of the 1986 Immigration Control and Reform Act and of its effects on undocumented immigration, supply of labor, and U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations. Dr. Vernez has compared the immigration and refugee policy regimes and their outcomes in western nations and has published a comprehensive assessment of the demographic, economic, institutional, and distributional effects of 30 years of immigration in California. His most recent work focuses on the educational attainment of immigrants and their children and on the costs and benefits of closing their educational gap. Dr. Vernez is a member of the Pacific Council.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

International migration is transforming Southern California into the world’s first global civil society. In addition to its population of European heritage, the region has become home to large immigrant Diasporas from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, China, Korea, The Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, India, Armenia, and Iran as well as smaller, but growing, Diasporas from many other countries from all continents. Southern California’s social, economic, and political ties are tilting ever more strongly towards the Pacific Rim in ways unmatched by either the rest of state or the nation. Can this social experiment in which no one cultural, ethnic, or racial group now has a majority succeed? Our key findings include:

Economically, immigrant Diasporas serve the region well. Immigrants’ work ethic, entrepreneurship, and lower labor costs have provided the region’s employers with a comparative advantage over their competitors, contributing to regional and state-wide economic growth that until recently exceeded that of the nation. Consumers and the immigrants themselves have both benefited economically from the immigrants’ presence, the former from lower costs for goods and services and the latter from a standard of living and opportunities for their children that most would not achieve in their country of origin.

However, there are costs to the region associated with its disproportionate share of inadequately educated immigrants. The increasing dependence of the region’s economy on immigrants is coinciding with a decline in the educational level of the region’s workforce, a reduction in investments by California manufacturers, possibly retarding technological improvements, and the closing down of underperforming plants. Native-born high school dropouts and graduates who are competing with immigrants for jobs are seeing their employment opportunities and real earnings decline. Finally, the large number of undereducated immigrants has led to an increased demand for state and local public services, particularly education, which California taxpayers are reluctant to support.

Overall, the social and political integration of the region’s immigrant Diasporas is proceeding apace free of the major tensions and strife common in so many other parts of the world thanks to a growing economy and consistent messages promoting tolerance. Although not apparent to the casual observer due to large influxes of new arrivals, considerable progress is actually being made on three key measures of societal integration: naturalization, English language acquisition, and participation in democratic institutions. Naturalizations of immigrants have tripled and that of Mexican immigrants, in particular, have increased tenfold over the last decade. Most immigrants acquire a working knowledge of the English language relatively quickly and nearly all in the second generation speak English well. Being monolingual in a foreign language is a characteristic of first generation immigrants only, not of their children. Along with naturalization, political participation by members of the region’s Diasporas is gradually increasing. For instance, Hispanics politicians now hold 23 percent of the seats in each of the two houses of the California legislature. And within the region, we are witnessing an increase in the number of instances where candidates for elected office from the same Diaspora are running against one another, a sign of the diversity of interests within any one Diaspora and of democratic and political maturity.

Although the governments of countries of origin are increasingly taking steps to strengthen and institutionalize economic and political ties with their respective Diasporas, the latter influence on U.S. Foreign Policy is likely to remain limited to narrow country-specific issues. Recognizing the potential source of political support for U.S. policies favorable to them and the economic significance and stabilizing influence of remittances sent home by emigrant Diasporas, foreign governments are
taking various steps to strengthen their ties to their citizens residing abroad. Most countries with the largest emigrant Diasporas in the region now allow them to hold dual citizenship, with Mexico being the latest country to have done so. Recently, Mexico appointed an advisory commission of Mexican-Americans to advise on Diasporas related issues and distributed in excess of one million identity cards (matricula consular) to undocumented immigrants allowing them to obtain drivers licenses and open bank accounts. Los Angeles has also become a must stop not only for Mexican politicians, but also for Chinese, Korean, and Japanese government officials. As with previous European and Jewish Diasporas, the young Diasporas in the region should be expected to seek to influence both the policies of their home countries and the foreign policies of the U.S. and California in ways that are favorable to their home countries. When they do, we can expect them to support policies that are generally consistent with U.S. and state interests including democratization, economic development, and support for their countries against the threat of outside interference.

Growing economic disparities within the region and the state fueled in part by immigration threaten the region’s social fabric. Although most immigrant Diasporas in the region are progressing economically in absolute terms, Hispanics, the overwhelming majority of whom are of Mexican origin, have been losing economically relative to non-Hispanic whites and the Asian Diasporas. Their children, in turn, are lagging in high school graduation, college attendance, and college graduation rates suggesting that a disproportionate share of them may not acquire the minimal college education that would allow them to compete in an economy that demands this level of educational attainment. Considering the fact that these children are now a majority of the children entering the region’s school system, if not reversed these trends will threaten the social stability and economic health of the region.

Although the region has few direct levers with which to alter federal and state policies, it can use its influence to support a number of steps that would assure the continuing and accelerated integration of the region’s Diasporas, including:

**Support increased investments in education, particularly post-secondary education.** A long-term plan should be devised to reverse disinvestment in California’s education system. This is necessary not only to minimize potential racial/ethnic conflicts within the region, but also to provide what will soon be a major share of the population with the means to compete in a regional economy that no longer creates jobs for its high school dropouts and graduates.

**Support changes in federal immigration policies.** The region should support policies that seek to reduce undocumented immigration, policies that may include an increase in legal immigration from Mexico in exchange for that country’s cooperation in border enforcement and a relative increase in the share of more educated immigrants. If these changes were linked to increased investments in education aimed at assisting those immigrants and children who are already here, the resistance to any changes in the status quo of federal immigration might be lessened. This “grand bargain” would reduce pressures on the state budget, benefit the lower income half of the region’s population, and keep the door open to immigration, albeit at a somewhat lower level.

**Continue the development of a civic culture based on tolerance and common values.** The messages that the region’s political and community leaders send about immigration and immigrants, and the vision that they hold for the region, help shape both the civic culture and the relationship that develops between the increasingly diverse racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups in the region. While these differences should be respected, public discourse and government policies should emphasize shared values and common goals.
PREFACE

This new report by Georges Vernez is the latest product from the Pacific Council’s project “Mapping the Local Implications of Globalization” in the U.S. West—a core activity of the Council’s Studies Program. Previous reports in this series have charted the impact of globalization in key regions of the American West, as well as challenges and opportunities in the area of infrastructure for international trade.

Georges Vernez’s report asks some important questions, and delivers some important conclusions. He traces the evolving pattern of migration to our region, and illustrates the ways in which international migration is fostering a global civil society in Southern California. New diasporas are reshaping the regional environment in a striking and largely positive fashion. They are also an engine of change in America’s international engagement and foreign policy. But the changing face of international migration poses new challenges for public policy—from education to governance. Continued smooth integration and social cohesion cannot be taken for granted, and will require new investments and policy adjustments. Above all, Vernez stresses the need to reinforce a civic culture based on tolerance and common values.

With our recently published report on infrastructure, and this new survey of international migration to Southern California, we are extending our analysis of globalization and the American West to embrace key functional issues, as well as regional effects. Over the coming year, we plan to explore new topics in this vein, including the regional implications of the evolving counter-terrorism and homeland security scene.

We are grateful to the Ford Foundation for its generous support of this project, as well as the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation for its support of a precursor project on Southern California’s global engagement.

Comments on this paper and the project as a whole are welcomed and may be addressed to the author, or to me, at the Pacific Council’s office in Los Angeles.

Dr. Ian O. Lesser
Vice President, Director of Studies
October 2003
I. INTRODUCTION

Thanks to international migration, Southern California has become the most culturally and ethnically diverse metropolitan area in the world. Over a relatively short time, it has become home to the largest Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Mexican, Salvadoran and Vietnamese Diasporas in the West and has large Diasporas of Indians, Armenians, Guatemalans, Iranians, Japanese and others. These immigrant communities are one of the region’s foremost economic advantages because of their work ethic and their economic and social ties to the countries of their origin. At the same time, how these immigrants integrate into the region’s civil society will shape Southern California’s future social, economic, and political landscape. In this respect, the Mexican Diaspora may play a unique role because of their sheer size—26 percent of the region’s population—and proximity to their country of origin.

Southern California’s transformation into today’s global community is rooted in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, which replaced national quotas with family reunification as the core criterion of the United States immigration policy. This legislation also opened the door, ever so slightly at first, to immigrants from Asia and the Western Hemisphere as well as immigrants whose skills were in short supply—engineers, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and currently computer programmers. Although unintended, these changes along with a large-scale amnesty for illegal immigrants in 19861 led to increasing numbers of legal immigrants settling in the United States—from 320,000 in the 1960s to 910,000 currently. It also led to a shift in the origin of immigrants from primarily European to predominantly Latin American and Asian origins. Conflicts in Indochina and Central America added momentum to these trends by means of an increased flow of refugees from these parts of the world.

Several factors have made the Los Angeles region2 the preferred location for these new immigrants. Rapid employment growth has been the primary draw for immigrants. Employment in Southern California grew 1.5 times faster than in California and 2.5 times faster than in the rest of the nation from 1960 to 1990. Even though employment generation in Southern California slowed and even declined in the early part of the 1990s, it still grew faster than that of the nation during the last decade. The physical accessibility of the region to Mexico and Central America and its status as the port of entry for people coming from Asia has led to Los Angeles playing the role that New York once played for European immigrants. Establishment in the midst of WWII of the bracero program, which at its peak recruited one million temporary Mexican workers to ease agricultural labor shortages, re-enforced Mexico’s historical relationship to California. When it was terminated in the early 1960s, it gave rise to the steady flow of undocumented workers we see today.

Unquestionably, the region’s economy has benefited from its immigrants.3 Local employers have benefited from immigrants’ lower costs, relatively high productivity, and entrepreneurial spirit. Immigrants have generated vibrant new communities, developing commerce and small industries and bringing a colorful set of new traditions.

At the same time, high levels of immigration into the region have caused frictions and deep-rooted concerns among the native-born population—as would be expected from any rapid social or economic transformation. The influx of a disproportionate number of less-educated immigrants negatively affects the job opportunities and earnings of similarly undereducated native-
The growing diversity of the region’s population may be seen as a harbinger of the direction the nation and, eventually, other developed nations are headed under globalization. The Los Angeles region hosts a social experiment that is drawing the attention of the world. In this assessment of where the region is headed we are optimistic, although not complacent, about its future. In the pages that follow, we examine in greater detail the growth and characteristics of Southern California’s numerous Diasporas; the contributions they make to the region’s economy and their effects on native-born residents and public services; the prospects for their economic and socio-political integration into the region’s civil society; and the opportunities they offer to expand the region’s worldwide ties. We then examine the uniqueness of the Mexican’s Diaspora and its implications for the region. In conclusion, we offer a set of steps that should be taken for the region to draw the most benefits from its various Diasporas.
II. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: THE NEW MELTING POT

Although always a destination for immigrants, it was not until the 1970s that their presence began to increase rapidly and dominate California’s demographic growth. During the 1970s, 1.8 million immigrants from all parts of the world entered the state, more than in all prior decades combined, followed by 3.5 million in the 1980s and 2.4 million more in the 1990s. Two-thirds of California’s immigrants now reside in Southern California, compared to about half of native-born citizens (Table 1). No other metropolitan region in the country has grown as rapidly since 1970 until growth was slowed by the recession of the early 1990s.4

MÚLTIPLE AND DIFFERING DIASPORAS

Today, the Los Angeles region is home to Diasporas with populations in excess of 100,000 people from eleven different countries: one from North America, two from Central America, six from Asia, and two from the Middle East (Table 2). These Diasporas account for half of the region’s population.

The Mexican Diaspora is not only the oldest in the region, it also dwarfs all others: 5.5 million strong and increasingly native-born, this Diaspora is ten times larger than the next largest Diaspora, the Filipino.

The Central American Diasporas from El Salvador and Guatemala are also highly concentrated in the Los Angeles region, but they are more recent than the Mexican Diaspora with 80 percent of its members being first generation immigrants.
The Asian Diasporas are the most numerous and diverse linguistically and culturally. The largest Asian group in the region is Filipino with half-million members. The oldest and, currently, one of the smallest Asian Diaspora is Japanese. Today, only one in three Japanese residents in the region is a first generation immigrant. The region also has sizable immigrant communities from China, Korea, Vietnam, and India. Like Salvadorans and Guatemalans, these latter Diasporas have grown rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s and are 80 percent first-generation immigrant. But unlike the Hispanic Diasporas, the Asian Diasporas vary in their predominant location patterns within the state. About half of Chinese and two-thirds of Indians reside in Northern California while Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese are more likely to have settled in Southern California.

Often overlooked are the increasingly sizeable Middle Eastern communities particularly from Armenia and Iran, both of which have also developed recently.

In size, immigrants of Hispanic origin dominate all other immigrant groups. They account for more than 60 percent of all immigrants and 29 percent of all native-born residents in the region. Their characteristics differ significantly from the Asian and Middle Eastern immigrants (Table 3). Foreign-born Hispanics are younger, have less formal education, larger families, higher fertility rates, and are less likely to be fluent in English. Because of these characteristics, their incomes are also lower than those members of the other immigrant Diasporas and considerably lower than the incomes of their native-born counterparts.

The fertility rates of Mexican-born women are notably higher than those of other immigrant and native-born women, as are the fertility rates of immigrants from Central America, although to a lesser extent. Today, half of all new births in the state of California are to Hispanic women, an increase from 20 percent in 1970. Only one other Diaspora, the Vietnamese, has a fertility rate that compares to that of Mexican immigrants.

By contrast, Asian and Middle Eastern immigrants are somewhat older, college educated, and command incomes that are close to their native-born counterparts. Their household size falls somewhere between native-born residents and immigrants of Hispanic origin. This is not to say that Asian immigrants are homogeneous in their socio-economic characteristics. Vietnamese

Table 3
Characteristics of Foreign Born Members of LA Region Major Diasporas, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Median age (years)</th>
<th>Less than 12 years of schooling (percent)</th>
<th>College degree (percent)</th>
<th>Percent who speak English well</th>
<th>Mean HH income (dollars)</th>
<th>HH income ratio to native-born HH</th>
<th>Median years in country</th>
<th>Number of children born to women aged 40-44</th>
<th>Median HH size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17,316</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20,607</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36,513</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27,712</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37,060</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>33,863</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Data based on population aged 25 or more. “n/a” means not available. “HH” means household.
immigrants, for example, have characteristics that are more similar to Mexican immigrants than to other Asian immigrants. Among the Middle Eastern Diasporas, Armenians are also considerably less educated and command lower incomes than Iranians and other Middle Easterners.

The only characteristic that most immigrant Diasporas in the region have in common is the recency of their settlement. Excluding the Mexican and Japanese Diasporas, all have as a majority of their members first generation immigrants who have resided in the region for 15 years or less. The relative “youth” of these developing Diasporas suggest that they are in the early stages of integration into Southern California’s social, economic and political fabric, thereby amplifying perceived differences in residential, cultural, linguistic, and economic patterns in the eyes of the native-born.

DEMANDS PLACED ON LOCAL JURISDICATIONS VARY

The different Diasporas are concentrated in different local jurisdictions of the region, and because they have widely different socio-economic characteristics, they place divergent demands on local public services. The Mexican population resides primarily east of downtown Los Angeles, along the highly industrialized Alameda corridor, extending east towards Pico Rivera and north towards the San Gabriel Valley—where the early Mexican immigrant population settled. By contrast, the majority of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan population resides west of downtown Los Angeles in the Pico Union, Westlake, and Hollywood areas. They also are increasingly settling in the San Fernando Valley, in Van Nuys and Reseda.

The Asian Diasporas also have settled in different geographical areas, and their residential patterns are more dispersed than are those of the Hispanic Diasporas. Chinese immigrants have settled north of downtown Los Angeles—beginning with Monterey Park and moving into Alhambra, San Marino, and other parts of the San Gabriel Valley. Outside of the San Gabriel Valley, they have settled in Hacienda Heights and Diamond Bar to the east, and Cerritos and Palos Verdes to the south. The highest density of Japanese outside of Little Tokyo is in the Gardena area south of Torrance. Japanese Diasporas have settled in the West Los Angeles areas of Sawtelle, Culver City, and Crenshaw, and in Monterey Park, Hacienda Heights and Cerritos.

Filipinos and Koreans, in turn, are similarly dispersed throughout the region—Filipinos in the Glendale area of the San Fernando Valley, Carson, West Long Beach, Seal Beach, and along Highway 60 from Woodside Village to Chino Hills. Koreans reside primarily in the Granada Hills and La Canada-Flintridge areas in the San Fernando Valley, in Korea Town west of downtown Los Angeles and in Carson, Torrance, Gardena, Fullerton, Rowland Heights, Cerritos, and Irvine.

The highest density of Vietnamese is found in the Bolsa Westminster areas of Orange County. Lower density Vietnamese communities have settled in Canoga Park of the San Fernando Valley, in Gardena, and the Rosemead/Monterey Park areas.

Just as the residential patterns of the Hispanic and Asian Diasporas overlap only minimally—if at all—so do the residential patterns of the Middle Eastern Diasporas. Armenians reside mainly in three locations: East Hollywood, Glendale, and Altadena. Wealthier Iranians reside mainly in the
West Los Angeles areas of Beverly Hills and Brentwood. In the San Fernando Valley, they have settled mainly in the Encino and Woodland Hills areas.

**THE REGION IS INCREASINGLY LOOKING SOUTH AND WEST**

The historical and cultural roots of the region’s population are changing in ways unmatched in the rest of the state and the nation. As late as 1970, the origin of the region’s population was similar to that of the state and the nation. Then, more than three-fourths of the population was of European extraction and only one in six residents was either Hispanic or Asian. Today, the population of European extraction in the region is no longer a majority. Two out of every five Southern Californians has his or her roots in Latin America, making Hispanics the dominant, although not majority, ethnic group in the region. Asians have also significantly increased their presence and their share now exceeds that of African Americans (Table 4). And because the natural birth rates of Hispanics and Asians exceed those of non-Hispanic whites and African Americans, these trends will continue well into this century regardless of future immigration patterns,9 further tilting the regional population’s social and political ties to the Pacific Rim.

### Table 4

**Distribution of Population by Immigration Status, 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic/racial group</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>California</th>
<th>Southern California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Americans</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indians</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans’</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (Thousands)</td>
<td>281,421</td>
<td>33,872</td>
<td>19,187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 2000 Census of Population of the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

*Includes Middle Easterners.*
III. IMMIGRANTS’ WORK ETHIC AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Over the years, the state and regional economy has grown to depend more and more on immigrant labor. As recently as 1960, immigrants filled only 10 percent of the state’s newly created jobs. This share increased to one-third of newly created jobs in the 1970s and eventually to more than 50 percent in the 1980s. During California’s recession and slow recovery period in the 1990s, immigrants not only filled 100 percent of the net 1 million jobs created between 1990 and 1997, they also began to replace native-born workers in other jobs. In Los Angeles County, this process of replacement began as early as the 1980s. During that decade, immigrants accounted for a sweeping 98 percent of employment growth in LA County, where four out of every five immigrants in the regional labor force were employed.

IMMIGRANTS’ COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Today, immigrants exceed 50 percent of the labor force not only in labor-intensive industries such as textiles, apparel, and personal services but also in key sectors such as construction, non-durable and durable manufacturing, retail, and business repairs. They also have a significant presence in the health, education, and even government sectors where their share of the labor force exceeds 25 percent.

As a result, the racial and ethnic diversity of the region’s population is reflected in most of the region’s industries. Such is the case for industries such as electronics, electric machines, aircraft parts, hospitals and even banking (Table 5). At the same time a few industries have become dominated by one ethnic group including textile/apparel and eat/drink places by Hispanics and computer/accounting by Asians while entertainment, communications, and education continue to be dominated by non-Hispanic whites. But even in these latter industries, the percentage of Asians and Hispanics is growing. Trends in the racial/ethnic composition of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic white</th>
<th>Industry share of total employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/apparel</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft parts</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, credit</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal service</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels &amp; Motels</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat/Drink places</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-12 education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges/Uni.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

labor force in specific industries reflect differences in educational attainment across racial/ethnic groups—educational differences mediated by historical patterns and racial/ethnic network-hiring practices.\textsuperscript{11}

Immigrants contributed to California's high employment growth during the 1970s and 1980s, accounting for about 12 percent of the sixteen-percent-point growth differential between California and the rest of the nation.\textsuperscript{12} Lower labor costs are the primary comparative advantage that immigrants provide to California and the region's employers. Immigrant wages have been about 10 percent lower than average native-born wages in the state and about 25 percent lower than native-born wages in Los Angeles County.\textsuperscript{13} California employers' labor costs have also been lower than those of employers elsewhere in the United States have been. At the same time, productivity—value added per manufacturing employee—in California has continued to exceed that of the rest of the nation, although it has been declining in the last decade or so. Indeed, employers report preferring immigrants to other workers because they are hard working, motivated, and possess a strong work ethic. They also report having no problems with managing a racially and ethnically diverse labor force apart from occasional language issues.\textsuperscript{14}

Immigrants contribute to the economy in other ways as well. They are disproportionately represented in many national research laboratories. Nobel laureates have been recognized for work done in U.S. post-graduate programs (in the sciences and engineering) and are increasingly represented on the faculties of the University of California at Los Angeles, Irvine, and San Diego, the University of Southern California, and the Claremont colleges.\textsuperscript{15} The National Research Council (1997) reports that the influence of foreign-born engineers has become profound in industrial research and development.

The propensity of some immigrant groups to start businesses with capital brought into the country or drawn from their own Diaspora contributes to job creation, although modestly. Members of the Chinese, Korean, Armenian, and Iranian Diasporas are twice as likely to be self-employed than the native-born, and up to five times more likely to be self-employed than members of the Mexican and Central American Diasporas.\textsuperscript{16} Differences in education and available resources across the various Diasporas explain why some are more entrepreneurial than others. The average immigrant business, however, is a relatively small, family-based business that provides services—groceries, clothing, laundries, and shoe repair—primarily to their own immigrant communities and employing few workers—perhaps one to two—outside the family. Entrepreneurs of different Diasporas specialize in different services: Koreans specialize in liquor stores and laundries; Chinese in restaurants; and Indians in hotels. College educated Middle Easterners are more likely to be self-employed in professional occupations such as doctors, accountants, and financial service professionals.\textsuperscript{17} Although the bulk of these activities are located in immigrant enclaves, they also benefit native-born residents by providing services at lower costs.\textsuperscript{18}

**IMMIGRATION HAS COSTS TOO**

The increasing dependence of the region's economy on immigrants coincides with two other trends that may erode the region's comparative advantage over time. The first is a relative decline in the educational level of the region's workforce. Whereas the average educational attainment of California and the region exceeded that of the rest of the nation by nearly one year in 1970, this advantage has turned into a six-month deficit at this date. The second is the continuing trend
towards lower investments in new capital by California manufacturers. Such investments have been about 5 percent lower annually in the 1970s to the mid 1990s than manufacturers have made in the rest of the nation. These trends are consistent with the view that the immigration of less-educated workers—the dominant trend in the region—provides an incentive for making lower capital investments thereby retarding technological improvements and preventing the closing down of low productivity plants.  

Although employers, consumers, and the immigrants themselves benefit from immigration, not all do so in the same measure. In particular, less educated native-born workers—high school dropouts and, to a lesser extent, those with a high school degree only—are most affected by the continuing immigration of similarly educated immigrants. They have seen their real earnings decline by an estimated 12 percent over what they might have been without immigration.  

Their employment opportunities have been similarly affected downwards. McCarthy and Vernez (1997) estimate that about one-fifth of the 20 percent decline in employment of native-born male high school dropouts in California is attributable to immigration, with African Americans more affected than other racial groups. Immigrants and high school dropouts compete for the same stagnant number of jobs because the regional economy has been generating no new jobs for them, as well as fewer and fewer new jobs for high school graduates. Immigrants have taken over the unskilled entry positions once filled by less-educated African Americans. Consequently, immigration has made younger, less-educated African Americans more likely to be unemployed in Los Angeles than in other metropolitan areas. 

Immigration of the volume and composition such as that in Southern California also leads to an increased demand for public services of all kinds. Immigrants with little education and large families are more likely to use public services than immigrants who do not share these characteristics. The high fertility rates of some immigrant groups in the region also lead to disproportionate demands on education that have been increasingly difficult to meet. One study estimates that the net annual public costs of providing state and local services to immigrants in California was $3,463 per immigrant household in 1996, resulting in an additional tax burden of $1,170 per native-born household. The fiscal impact on local governments can be expected to be higher within the region because immigrants are concentrated here and a disproportionate share of them has little education. This imbalance may in part contribute to the reluctance of California taxpayers to support needed increases in public service expenditures such as education, health, and infrastructure.
IV. INTEGRATION INTO CIVIL SOCIETY

Concerns are often raised that today’s immigrants are not assimilating at the same rate as immigrants did at the beginning of the last century.25 Those holding this view can point to various trends that act as supporting evidence: (1) record numbers of immigrants have arrived over a longer, uninterrupted period of time than ever before in the nation’s history; (2) there exists today a growing cultural and linguistic diversity coupled with a greater emphasis on maintaining that diversity; (3) educational and economic gaps between immigrants and native-born are widening; (4) changes in the state economic structure now overwhelmingly rewards workers with college education, which the majority of immigrants do not have and a disproportionate share of their children do not acquire; (5) travel to and maintaining ties with the home country is progressively easier; and (6) the number of countries providing dual citizenship and allowing expatriates to vote in local and national elections is increasing.

Given this combination of trends potentially inimical to the rapid integration of the immigrant waves of the last 30 years, no one can predict how Southern California’s civil society, and, eventually, that of the nation, will look 20 to 30 years from now. It is, however, useful to remember that the integration of previous waves of immigrants has occurred not in the span of one generation, but over the course of several generations. Keeping this long-term and multi-generational integration process in mind, there is reason for optimism regarding the integration of today’s immigrants into the region’s civil society. Considerable progress is actually being made on three measures of societal integration—naturalization, language acquisition, and political involvement, although the speed of this progress differs across Diasporas. At the same time, there are reasons to be concerned about the economic integration of some of the region’s immigrants.

**NATURALIZATION**

Naturalization is perhaps the most symbolic and important signal of an immigrant’s integration into American society and most immigrants take this step within their lifetime.26 Members of the Asian and Middle Eastern Diasporas tend to naturalize early and at high rates. One half to two-thirds of immigrants from the Philippines, China, Korea, India, Vietnam, and the Middle East naturalize within fifteen years of arrival (Table 6) and nearly all (85 to 90 percent) do so within their lifetime. Members of the Hispanic Diasporas—particularly from Mexico—and Canadians generally take longer to naturalize with one in five Canadian and Mexican immigrants taking this step within fifteen years of arrival. Still, a majority of them (70 to 80 percent) naturalize within their lifetime.27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of origin</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>15 years</th>
<th>25 years</th>
<th>30 years or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, Japan, Korea</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** McCarthy and Vernez (1997), Table 5.11.
Naturalizations have more than tripled over the last decade from about 270,000 in the year 1990 to 900,000 in 2000, with immigrants from Mexico exhibiting a tenfold increase from 17,000 to 190,000 (Table 7). The increase in the number of immigrants is one, but not the most important, reason for this remarkable increase in those seeking U.S. citizenship. Changes in attitudes and policies, both in the United States and in Mexico, are equally important. In the United States, long-term residents were required to replace their old green cards with new ones at about the same fee that is required for naturalization. In 1994, the passage of Proposition 187 in California, and then the passage in 1996 of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) that limited access to public services for non-citizens galvanized immigrant communities to naturalize to avoid the loss of public benefits. Non-governmental agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which spent $77 million to facilitate and clear a backlog of legal immigrants seeking naturalizations, aided this process. In addition, the naturalization of Mexican immigrants was facilitated by Mexico’s removal of a major disincentive to U.S. naturalization. In 1998, it passed a new law allowing naturalized U.S. citizens of Mexican origin and their children born in the United States to maintain dual nationality, thereby allowing them to keep and buy property in Mexico.

Practical reasons appear to have driven the last decade’s increase in naturalizations for Hispanic immigrants more than for other immigrants. The former are, indeed, more likely than immigrants from other countries to report they had naturalized “to make it easier to get certain jobs” or “to have better legal rights and protections”. However, they were also as likely as other immigrants to indicate that a major reason for naturalization was “to get the right to vote” and “to show commitment and pride in being an American”.

**LANGUAGE**

For many, language is culture. With more than 40 percent of the population in the region speaking a language other than English at home, English monolingual native-born residents may perceive that the predominance of their language is being jeopardized, all the more so because of the widespread use of Spanish in public and in work places. Spanish is used by more than one-quarter of the region’s population and is spoken by thirteen times more people than the next most common languages from China. Ironically, this concern coincides with English having become the international language of trade, business, and tourism worldwide. Nations with cultures exceedingly more entrenched than the American culture—France and Germany for instance—are themselves concerned with their culture being Americanized beyond recognition. As Kaplan (1997) notes “multiculturalism has emerged as an ideal or a cause (and to others a concern) at precisely the moment when the global marketing of largely American popular culture threatens local cultural expression virtually everywhere.”

### Table 7

**Number of Naturalizations by Country of Origin, 1990-2000 (Thousands)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
**NOTE:** Number of naturalizations rounded up to the closest thousand.
The fact is that immigrants acquire a working knowledge of the English language relatively rapidly. Even for Hispanic immigrants who are three times less likely than Asians to speak English upon their arrival or acquire it, to be monolingual in Spanish is a characteristic of immigrants only, not of their children and certainly not of their grandchildren. For immigrants, learning English is vitally important for practical reasons, such as getting a job. They also place a particular premium on having their children learn English as rapidly as possible. About 75 percent of immigrants generally and 54 percent of Mexican immigrants in particular agree with the statement that “public schools should teach new immigrants English as quickly as possible even if this means they fall behind”. A majority of immigrants also agrees with the statement “public classes should be taught in English.” California voters reflected these views when they approved Proposition 227, which curbed the use of bilingual education in the state’s public schools.

**PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS**

At the same time as the naturalization of immigrants and their acquisition of the English language are increasing, political participation by members of the region’s Diasporas is also gradually spreading. Naturalized and native-born Hispanics and Asians are still somewhat less likely to register, and, in turn, to vote than non-Hispanic whites. But these differences are generally accounted for by differences in age distribution, education and income and will be reduced over time. In California, a surge of Hispanic naturalization has led to large increases of first-time voters in recent presidential, state, and local elections. Although Hispanics comprise merely 10 percent of California voters, Hispanic politicians now hold 23 percent of the seats in each of the two houses of the California legislature. And in recent years, Hispanic voters have been credited for their contribution to the passage of several school bond issues.

Still the process of immigrant integration along these dimensions will take place over decades and across generations. It remains to be seen how the region’s increasingly fragmented multi-ethnic society will integrate socially and politically. Will these changes have no lasting effect—as the political enfranchisement of women in the 1920s and 1930s and of young people in the 1970s had no long-term effects—or will they lead to a predominantly ethnic-based, conflict-ridden polity?

At the beginning of the century, ethnicity among European immigrants was overshadowed by class and education as influences on their political integration, with ethnicity playing only an occasional role, primarily at the local level. And even though the attitudinal and institutional context in which immigrants integrate today differs from that of a century ago and may, arguably, encourage them to maintain their distinctiveness, there are a number of reasons for being optimistic about the full integration of the region’s Diasporas in the future. First, the increasing naturalization of large numbers of immigrants and their acquisition of the English language is diminishing their political marginalization. As noted earlier, increasing numbers of representatives of the various Diasporas are sitting on state and local legislative and executive bodies. Within the region, we are also witnessing an increase in the number of instances where candidates for elected office from the same Diaspora are running against one another, an unmistakable sign of the diversity of interests within any one Diaspora and of democratic and political maturity.

Second, immigrants, naturalized or not, are concerned with the same range of public issues that concerns native-born residents; issues that are in the mainstream of our two-party debates.
For instance, a majority of both citizens and non-citizens of Mexican and non-Hispanic whites believe there are too many immigrants in the United States. On controversial public policy issues—such as quotas for jobs/college admissions, capital punishment, and abortion—Hispanics take moderate positions. One third of Mexican origin voters supported quotas compared to only 6 percent for non-Hispanic whites. Generally, and consistent with their socio-economic conditions, Hispanics are more likely to perceive a need for expanding education, health and others services and may be more willing to pay additional taxes to provide them.

Third, everyday activities bring people from all national, racial and ethnic backgrounds together in work places, in stores, and in public places providing the foundation for exchanges and understanding. Although tensions certainly exist between immigrants and established residents and hate crimes do occur, Bach (1993, p. 159) concludes that “the incidence of conflicts is much less than suggested by media reports...communities contain everyday encounters that bring about coexistence, accommodation and change in quick but stark contrast to the dramatic portraits of conflict.”

Fourth, no one ethnic group or Diaspora is so economically, socially, or politically homogenous as to form one voice, except on rare occasions. The “Asian” and “Hispanic” Census Bureau categories have no more meaning in describing group uniformity of views than does the non-Hispanic white category. There are significant self-identity differences between Mexican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and other Hispanic nationalities similar to those between European immigrants from England, Germany, Ireland, and Italy at the beginning of the century. For instance, Mexican-American citizens report that they are personally closer to Anglos and African-Americans than they are to people of either Puerto Rican or Cuban origins. Very little can be presumed from the language commonality of Hispanics. After all, the majority of native-born Hispanics do not speak Spanish.

Asians are even more diverse than Hispanics. Unlike the latter, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Koreans, Indians and other nationals share no common language, religion, culture, or history. Furthermore, Asian Diasporas range from the well-established Japanese Diasporas, which reached economic parity with the most successful non-Hispanic white communities, to the displaced and poor Vietnamese and Laotian Diasporas.

The increase in intermarriages across Diasporas is also diminishing the ethnic identity and cohesion of any one Diaspora. The 1990 Census indicated that a third of all Asian and 28 percent of Hispanic marriages were to non-Asians and non-Hispanics, respectively. Time also weakens ethnic identity. The immigrant experience belongs to the first generation. In the absence of continuing migration, ethnic identity is diluted even though it may not disappear. Even in the context of the region’s continuing immigration, group identities are unlikely to span the generations. While the first generation might maintain close ties with the home country, international kinship and friendship networks are weakened for the second and subsequent generations. Gradually, the goals pursued by the different generations diverge.

Finally, with diversity in the region and state increasing, those public policies that encourage identity politics and grant special treatment based on one’s race, ethnicity, or country of origin are coming (and will continue to come) under increasing scrutiny and pressures for change.
Recently, California voters overwhelmingly approved the elimination of racial/ethnic preferences in the state’s public sector including higher education. Similarly, the Los Angeles School Board eliminated its various ethnic and identity-based commissions in favor of a single Human Relations panel. Civil rights advocates, such as Hicks and Oh talk about the need to develop a civic culture that moves beyond identity politics and is based on a set of core values and principles. They advocate “…the construction of a social ethic of sharing, not a belief in differences and separation.” Similarly, public figures (in part concerned about the potential fallout that might have followed from the 9/11 tragedy) from the President of the United States on down to the Mayor of Los Angeles and his new chief of police have been promoting messages of tolerance. Taken together, these trends are leading to adjustments in the way we view ourselves, each other, and public governance that will minimize racial and ethnic divisions.

THE KEY CHALLENGE: REDUCING ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES

Growing economic disparities between the various immigrant Diasporas and the native-born, not ethnic diversity, is the key challenge to the full integration of immigrants in the region. The slow educational and economic progress made by the Hispanic Diasporas in particular should be of great concern. These disparities have increased more rapidly in the region than anywhere else in the state or the country.

Although Hispanic immigrants in the region are progressing economically in absolute terms with time, they have been losing ground relative to non-Hispanic Whites and to immigrants from Asia and the Middle East. Income inequalities in the state have increased by 50 percent since 1970 with immigration estimated to account for one third of this increase. Similarly, the college attendance and college completion gap between Hispanic and other students has been increasing. For instance, the graduation rate of native-born Hispanics aged 25-29 years old has remained constant at about 14.5 percent since 1990 whereas that of non-Hispanic whites has increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 2000. While Hispanic children are generally graduating from high school, they are neither going to college nor graduating from college in high enough proportions to reverse the decline in the over-all educational level of the region, leaving them unable to compete in a regional economy that rewards a college education. The magnitude of the challenge can be gauged by considering that the majority of students entering schools in the region are Hispanics and that a majority of these children will be raised in families where both parents have less than a high school education and whose income is in the lowest quartile.

If current trends are allowed to continue, income disparities can be expected to grow between the region’s classes. But, unlike immigrants who perceive their stagnant economic well-being to be better than the one they would have enjoyed had they stayed in Mexico, Guatemala, or El Salvador, their children’s lack of economic opportunities for advancement are unlikely to satisfy their aspirations. Increasing class disparities dividing almost equally a predominantly African and Hispanic American underclass on the one hand and a predominantly Asian and non-Hispanic white middle and privileged class on the other may well sow the seeds for social unrest in the region. In turn, a real or perceived exclusion of a large segment of the population from economic opportunities would encourage ethnic-based politics that could tear apart state and regional polities at the seam.
V. EXPANDING TIES WITH THE WORLD

Growth of the various Diasporas in Southern California generates both opportunities for increased trade and concerns about their future role in the economic and political affairs of their originating countries and current home. History suggests that, initially, immigrant communities keep strong ties with their country of origin, but that these ties diminish over time. Even at the turn of the 20th Century, frequent back and forth movements and intensive investments in and contacts with countries of origin were reported, particularly amongst the Italian Diaspora. At that time, the Italian government set up institutions to facilitate the return of immigrants and of their savings for the development of Italy, not unlike the efforts currently made by the Mexican and other governments with regard to their respective Diasporas in the United States. Today, the low cost of transportation and communication allow for more frequent return trips and contacts with the home country. For some Diasporas’ members, economic globalization—free flows of capital, goods, and services—makes it feasible and even desirable to maintain businesses both here and in the home country.

POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED TRADE

Immigrants’ know-how, entrepreneurship, and political access provides the region’s industries with a window of opportunity to expand into the Mexican, Latin American, and Asian markets, thereby potentially increasing their market share in these parts of the world. Immigrants may help identify joint venture opportunities and may accelerate the transmission of free market entrepreneurship and values to their home countries. The extent to which the region will benefit from these transnational exchanges is not automatic, however, and has yet to be aggressively exploited. To date, export trends from California (and its Southern region) lend uneven support for a link between immigration and increased trade with the country of origin. On the one hand, the overall growth in export trade from Southern California has mirrored the national trend and lagged slightly behind growth in the rest of the State of California. On the other hand, the region produces a disproportionate share of made-in California goods exported to Mexico, Japan, and South Korea. These countries have three of the oldest Diasporas in the region and account for 40 percent of exports made in the region. Thanks to NAFTA, the region, like the rest of California, has benefited from a three-fold increase in exports to Mexico over the last decade.

BENEFITS TO AND INFLUENCE ON HOME COUNTRIES

For many countries of origin, the remittances sent by their emigrants are an important source of foreign exchange and have a stabilizing social influence. They stimulate aggregate demands for local products and services and improve the standard of living for a significant share of the people left behind in communities of origin. The estimated $9 billion in annual remittances constitute Mexico’s second largest source of foreign exchange without counting receipts from immigrants’ return visits. These remittances upgrade the standard of living of family members who have remained behind and are credited with contributing to the political stability of Mexico. In El Salvador, remittances amounting to nearly $2 billion annually account for up to 25 percent of GNP. They are so important to the country’s economy that its president successfully lobbied the Clinton administration to regularize the status of undocumented Salvadorans in the United States.
Countries of origin also benefit from (business and other investments) made by members of their Diasporas in the United States. For instance, there are hundreds of Mexican civic, sport, and religious associations in the Los Angeles region that maintain ties with their respective villages of origin. Some of these linkages contribute to public works projects in their home communities.

The importance of emigrant Diasporas to sending countries goes beyond their role as a source of foreign exchange, economic development and social stability. They are also being recognized as a potential source of political support for U.S. policies favorable to the home countries. Cognizant of this potential, sending countries are increasingly taking steps to strengthen and institutionalize links to their respective Diasporas. This is not new, as noted earlier, but the multiplicity of these efforts is new, and their long-term consequences, positive or negative, are yet to be seen.

Moving rapidly beyond its traditional concern with human rights, the government of Mexico has been particularly aggressive in its recent efforts to advocate for and gain the support of its Diaspora in the United States. Beginning in 1990, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari established the program for Mexican Communities Living in Foreign Countries (PMCLFC) in order to reach out to Mexicans living in the United States. The 1995-2000 National Development Plan contained an initiative entitled “Mexican Nation” designed to strengthen the cultural links with Mexicans abroad. In 1998, the Mexican Congress approved dual nationality for immigrants of Mexican origin and their children residing abroad, a change that is expected to lead to their right to vote in Mexican as well as United States elections. And recently, President Fox appointed an advisory commission of 150 Mexican-Americans to advise his administration on Diaspora related issues. He has also actively lobbied for a second amnesty for undocumented Mexican immigrants, an effort that was sidetracked by the 9/11 tragedy. Finally, the Mexican consulates in the United States have distributed in excess of one million identity cards (matricula consular) to undocumented Mexican immigrants allowing them to obtain drivers licenses and open bank accounts.

In addition to Mexico, many other countries are seeking to strengthen ties with their citizens residing abroad by allowing them to hold dual citizenship. Of the countries of origin with the largest Diasporas in the region, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Philippines, India/Pakistan, Iran and Vietnam allow dual citizenship and several allow their U.S. naturalized immigrants to vote in their national and, in some cases, even local elections. With increased economic interdependence between sending countries and the United States, it should be expected that the former would increasingly cultivate their respective Diasporas in order to further their economic and political interests.

If Diasporas can help sending countries influence U.S. policies (see next section) in their favor, they can also influence the economic and social policies of sending countries in ways that are consistent with U.S. interests. Indeed, when involved with the political affairs of their home countries, immigrants tend to support measures that would further open both the political process and the economy of their country of origin. Los Angeles has also become a necessary stop for Mexican, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese government officials in order to meet key members of their respective Diasporas. The experience of immigrants, some coming as refugees from repressive regimes and others as economic migrants seeking to improve their family’s lives, conditions their views of...
the United States relative to their home countries. In this comparison, they
give the United States high marks on such key items as economic opportuni-
ties, woman’s rights, possessing a legal system worthy of trust, and having an
honest government.60

**DIASPORAS INFLUENCE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICIES**

With the increase in the number and size of the region’s and country’s
Diasporas comes an increase in the diversity of country-specific lobbies seek-
ing to influence local and federal policies in their favor. Such organized lob-
bies are nothing new and historically have varied greatly in their
sophistication, power, and share of successes and defeats.

The Jewish/Israeli lobby is the most visible and continues to be consid-
ered the most powerful of these transnational communities. Following
WWII, American Jews formed the Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons
to pressure the U.S. Congress to allow resettlement of Holocaust victims in
the United States. Since then, Jewish groups have consistently lobbied for the
admission of Jews from the Soviet Union and other communist countries.
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) continues to play a
major role in shaping U.S. policy towards Israel and the Middle East.

Although smaller than the Jewish American community, the Cuban community has also
been successful in shaping both immigration and foreign policies towards Cuba. The favorable
treatment granted Cuban refugees attests to the strength of this Diaspora. To date, it has suc-
cceeded in maintaining both economic sanctions against Cuba and the long-term U.S. effort to
topple the Castro regime.

Although less visible, other Diasporas have influenced U.S. foreign policies effectively. In the
early 1990s, the Irish Diaspora successfully lobbied Congress for 55,000 slots for “diversity”
immigrants with the understanding that most of these visas would initially go to Irish citizens.
It also played a role in U.S. policy towards Northern Ireland. Similarly, the Armenian American
community lobbied successfully for large aid packages to Armenia. It also obtained a provision in
the 1992 Freedom Support Act denying Azerbaijan the same aid as is provided to all other for-
mer Soviet republics until it ceased its blockade of Armenia.61 The well-organized Greek
American community has been active in lobbying for American pressure on Turkey over the
Cyprus issue.

Targeting specific country Diasporas for funds to support political campaigns has long been
a familiar sight in the U.S. political landscape. Former Governor Michael Dukakis raised up to
25 percent of his 1988 presidential campaign budget from the Greek community.62 The list of
congressional groups catering to the interest of ethnic communities is as long as the list of ethnic
groups—a caucus on India and Indian-Americans, a caucus on Armenian issues, a friend of
Ireland caucus, an Albanian issues caucus, an Hispanic caucus, and so on.63

Several lessons can be drawn from these and other experiences that bear on the future politi-
cal behavior of the more recent Diasporas. First, most Diasporas focus their political energies in
one or more of three areas: maintaining open migration opportunities for their compatriots, sup-
porting economic development and democratization in their country of origin, and supporting
their country of origin against outside threats or interference. Second, the relative influence of the country’s lobby is independent of its size, but is commensurate with the strategic importance of the country to U.S. interests. Third, a specific country’s lobby is likely to be more effective if its interests are congruent with general U.S. policies. Fourth, there is more activism and unity of purpose among refugees—such as Jews, Cubans, and Armenians—than among economic migrants—such as Greeks, Filipinos, Indians, and Mexicans.

We expect the newer immigrant Diasporas to follow the path of the older Diasporas and to seek to influence both California and U.S. foreign policies towards their respective countries and the Pacific Rim. Like previous waves of immigrants, these Diasporas will focus primarily on the welfare of their members and on matters that directly affect their countries of origin. Among the newest regional communities, refugee groups are initially more likely to be politically active. Indeed, one of the most recent Diasporas, the Vietnamese American community, organized rapidly and established various organizations—including the National Congress of Vietnamese Americans (NCVA) and the Vietnamese-American Political Action Committee—that eventually influenced the federal legislation that established Radio Free Asia and extended favorable treatment to Vietnamese refugees stranded in Hong Kong in the late 1980s. Human Rights and free elections in Vietnam are the foreign policy priorities for this Diaspora. The other major refugee Diaspora, the Iranian Diaspora, has been slow in organizing politically, but it has recently begun actively and openly speaking out on Iranian issues, although with diverging voices.

Diasporas dominated by economic migrants have yet to develop potent political lobbies for U.S. policies affecting their country of origin, in part because these communities are currently more concerned about their own economic welfare. They also may be more divided on issues concerning their country of origin. Still, they can find a unified voice when their country’s stability or sovereignty are threatened such as when the Filipino Diasporas sought to influence U.S. policy in support of replacing Ferdinand Marcos with Corazon Aquino and when Indian-Americans lobbied to influence U.S. nuclear policy toward Pakistan and within South Asia. More recently, Asian Americans from all Diasporas were united in their successful opposition to attempts to end immigration preferences for adult brothers, sisters, and parents of adult U.S. immigrants.

Among Asian Diasporas, the Chinese Diaspora is one of the largest and perhaps most critical to U.S. foreign policy. The political potency of this Diaspora will depend on its ability to unite a community of varied political views and languages from Taiwan, Hong-Kong, and Mainland China. If it becomes active, however, this Diaspora can be expected to focus its efforts towards the democratization of Mainland China.

In turn, the Central American Diasporas are too recent and the immigration status of its members too uncertain—as many are undocumented or were granted Temporary Protective Status—to be concerned with issues other than the regularization of their immigration status and their own economic well-being. In the long term, the concern of these Diasporas can be expected to focus more heavily on development, human rights, corruption, and democratization issues in their country of origin.
VI. THE MEXICAN DIASPORA: HOW UNIQUE?

Among all Southland Diasporas, it is the Mexican Diaspora that raises the most interest for the potential opportunities it offers and the most concerns regarding its future integration into the region’s and nation’s civil society. One in every four persons in the region is of Mexican origin and this share is bound to increase due to continuing immigration and high fertility rates. Widespread use of the Spanish language and our shared border with Mexico fuel the perception of a population unwilling to integrate linguistically and culturally. Furthermore, aggressive and well publicized courting of this population by the government of Mexico and the view held by an extreme minority that Mexico has a territorial claim to the Southwest has raised the specter of a growing population of Mexican origin in the Southland whose allegiance might lie more with Mexico than with the United States.

Although size, proximity to their country of origin, and courting by the Mexican government matter, there is little empirical evidence that the Southland Mexican Diaspora is not integrating linguistically, is not naturalizing, and is not increasingly participating in state and local democratic institutions as was noted earlier. To the casual observer, however, this integration process appears to be slow, if not non-existent, because of the continuing arrival of large numbers of new immigrants. Two-thirds of Mexican-origin immigrants have been in the country for less than 12 years, and because of low levels of education their propensity to learn English, make economic progress, and naturalize is lower than for other immigrants.

At the same time, Hispanics, an overwhelming majority of whom are of Mexican origin, have been losing ground economically relative to non-Hispanic whites and Asians as noted earlier. As University of California at Los Angeles Professor Waldinger (1996) concluded, “…there is substantial evidence to indicate that the newcomers from Mexico find themselves not only at the bottom, but a bottom that is increasingly removed from the top and from which exit is hard to find.” As a result, a large proportion of Mexican origin children are growing up in poverty and current trends in educational attainment indicate that many of these children will not acquire the minimal college education that would allow them to compete in the local economy. Although progress is being made, with enrollments in the state’s K-12 system growing by more than 110,000 students every year the challenge is overwhelming. Two-thirds of this growth is taking place in the southern part of the state and is mostly accounted for by newcomers of Mexican origin whose high school graduation rate of 78 percent is 15 percentage points lower than their counterparts and whose college graduation rate of 12 percent is 2.5 times lower than that of non-Hispanics whites. If these youths’ expectations for a better life than that of their parents are unfulfilled, the social fabric of the region will be threatened.

With respect to the relationship between this Diaspora and Mexico, an effective Mexican-American lobby on behalf of Mexico is not expected to develop rapidly, if at all, for reasons noted earlier and briefly summarized here. First, given its overall low educational level and economic status, the Mexican Diaspora will focus on the immediate issues concerning its own economic well being and progress. Second, the Diaspora is politically and economically heterogeneous, with diverging short-run interests between the first and subsequent generations. Third, having voted
with its feet, this community is suspicious of the Mexican government. To the extent it may have preferred policies and reforms towards Mexico, the Mexican Diaspora will predominantly support policies that are generally consistent with U.S. interests including democratization of its political processes, economic development, the opening of its economy to foreign investment and trade, and peaceful solutions to difficult internal issues such as in Chiapas.

Domestically, the self-interests of members of the Mexican Diaspora can be expected to predominate. Like other disadvantaged immigrant groups in the past, they will favor (and are favoring) public policies that support their economic advancement. For instance, they are more concerned with education, economic opportunity, and safety-net issues than with environmental protection issues. Younger than other communities, the Mexican Diaspora may also be less responsive to issues related to aging populations—issues more salient to non-Hispanic white communities. Members of the Mexican Diaspora will gravitate towards parties and candidates that promise to serve best this domestic mix of interests and hence, it is not surprising that a majority vote Democratic. Ethnic loyalty is likely to come second to these bread and butter issues except in those occasional instances when the community feels negatively targeted such as was the case with Proposition 187.

“Members of the Mexican Diaspora will gravitate towards parties and candidates that promise to serve best this domestic mix of interests and hence, it is not surprising that a majority vote Democratic.”
VII. CONCLUSIONS: STEPS TO SPEED UP INTEGRATION

The diversity and size of the Los Angeles immigrant Diasporas has increased over the past 25 years at a pace without precedent in the history of migrations to the United States. As a result, the historical and cultural roots of the region’s population are shifting rapidly from Europe to Latin America and Asia and this trend can be expected to continue well into this century regardless of future immigration patterns. The region and the state benefit from the work ethic, entrepreneurship, and lower labor costs of its immigrants. Nevertheless, not all in the region benefit equally. Employers, consumers, and the immigrants themselves are the primary beneficiaries of immigration. But the work opportunities and real earnings of less-educated—primarily high school dropouts and increasingly high school graduates—native-born workers have declined over time. Moreover, the number of immigrants with limited educations has increased demands for public services, particularly education and health care, that the population at large is reluctant to finance.

How the Los Angeles region’s numerous and growing Diasporas integrate and coexist will determine in large measure its outlook. Their economic, social and political integration is proceeding at a pace at least as rapid as previous generations of immigrants, although this progress is partially masked to the casual observer by the continuing arrival of large numbers of new immigrants. Optimism about the ongoing integration of the region’s millions of newcomers and about the development of a regional polity free of excessive ethnic antagonism does not suggest complacency, however. Although the region has few direct levers to alter federal and state policies, it can use its influence to support a number of steps that would assure that this process continues not just unabated, but at an accelerated pace, and that the opportunities offered by the new arrivals are seized.

Support increased investments in education, most particularly post-secondary education. The successful integration of all immigrant Diasporas into civil society and the economic future of the region requires that economic progress be made by less educated immigrants, principally Mexican and other Hispanic immigrants, and their children. The majority of students in the region is Hispanic and while their high school graduation rate is improving, their college graduation rate remains more than two times lower than those of non-Hispanic whites and Asians. A plan should be devised, and eventually financed, to reverse disinvestment in California higher education in order to increase the share of these students eligible for college and to guarantee that they can attend and eventually graduate from college. This is necessary not only to minimize potential racial/ethnic conflicts within the region, but also to provide what will soon be a majority of the population with the means to compete in a regional economy that no longer creates jobs for high school dropouts and graduates, and to reverse the decline in the education level of the region’s labor force.

The current state budget deficit does not permit full financing of this step in the immediate future. However, there is no reason to delay the development of such a plan and to use it to increase public awareness of both current demographic trends and the need to provide post-secondary institutions with the means to respond effectively to a changing and growing demand.
Support changes in federal immigration policies. The rapid growth of a poorly educated population in the region fueled by high level of immigration is contributing to the state’s difficulty in meeting growing demands for educational and health services given current budgetary constraints. The region should support federal policies that seek to reduce undocumented immigration. Such policies include enforcement of employer sanctions, an increase in legal immigration from Mexico in exchange for that country’s government cooperation in border enforcement, and a relative increase in the share of more educated immigrants.

We recognize that any suggested changes in the status quo of federal immigration policies are extremely controversial and are likely to draw strong opposition from pro-immigration groups. However, if these changes were linked to increased investments that would benefit those immigrants and their children who are already here (as recommended above), such opposition might be alleviated. Over the long-term, such a grand bargain would reduce pressures over the state budget, benefit the lower-income half of the region’s population, and keep the door open to immigration, albeit at a lower level.

Encourage the integration of immigrants. The pace of naturalization and linguistic and political integration are likely to be perceived to be too slow for a region that is continuously replenished with new immigrants. The region should work together to lobby the state and the federal governments for more funding to support English classes for immigrants, and to encourage naturalization and voter registration. Jurisdictions in the region working together should also support the efforts of community-based agencies serving immigrants.

Expand cooperation between the region’s local jurisdictions. Residential patterns of the various immigrant Diasporas and native-born populations lead to sharply different priorities and service needs across the region’s local jurisdictions. Various cooperative mechanisms have already been developed that involve jurisdictions within parts of the region such as the South Bay Cities Council of Governments and a similar effort under way among Westside jurisdictions to deal with common policy issues. These efforts should be broadened to develop a better regional understanding of the differences and commonalities of immigrant issues and develop opportunities for the benefits of local jurisdictions and the region. Such efforts require no major investments other than an initial willingness to sit down and identify issues that can only be tackled with the cooperation of multiple local jurisdictions. As noted, local jurisdictions are best suited to address the priorities of their immigrant communities, such as transportation, childcare, and health services, but at the same time may not have the resources to do so alone.

Strengthen economic and tourist ties with countries of origin. The window of opportunity to take advantage of the still existing ties between the region’s Diasporas and their originating countries will not remain open forever as time dulls those relationships and as other jurisdictions with Diasporas of their own seek to develop similar ties. Working as a region, public figures should seek to cooperate with business leaders from the largest Diasporas to develop formal relationships with countries such as Mexico, Japan, China, and the Philippines with an eye to expanding trade and tourism. This may involve systematically bringing together leaders from the business, academic, and government communities from the region and the various countries of origin to discuss international issues and potential opportunities, encouraging exchanges of students and professors
between universities in the region and sending countries, and possibly establishing Southern California trade and tourist offices in the key originating countries of the region’s Diasporas.

**Continue to encourage the development of a civic culture based on tolerance and common values.** (The messages about immigration and immigrants and the vision that the region’s political and community leaders project will be key to the civic culture and the relationships that develop among the increasingly diverse racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups in the region.) This is especially important in a post 9/11 environment, amidst heightened concerns about security. The messages of tolerance sent by public figures from mayors down to police chiefs along with the increasing success of ethnic candidates for public office when they appeal for support from all racial/ethnic groups assist towards this end. Personal, ethnic, and cultural pride in one’s group identity should be respected, but public policies should emphasize shared values and common goals.

Southern California is being transformed into a global civil society, one whose diversity of origins is without precedent and in which no one ethnic or racial group is a majority. Thus far, the social, political, and economic integration of these newcomers and their children has proceeded apace free of the major tensions and strife common in so many other parts of the world, thanks to a growing economy and a consistent promotion of tolerance. Can this success be sustained? Already, too many of these newcomers are being left behind economically and too many of their children are not being provided with the education needed to compete in an economy that disproportionately rewards a college education. In addition, the time when the region’s employment growth exceeded that of the nation may well be a thing of the past. In the long-term, increased investments in education and adjustments in federal immigration policies will be essential for maintaining the competitiveness of the region and reversing the growing income inequalities in the region. In addition, the success of what many have come to regard as the California social experiment depends on the continued encouragement of the development of a civic culture based on tolerance and common values.
# Figures and Tables

## Tables

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ENDNOTES

1 About 2.8 millions previously undocumented immigrants were legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.

2 The Los Angeles region includes the Census Los Angeles CMSA and San Diego County.

3 McCarthy and Valdez (1986); Mueller and Espenshade (1986); McCarthy and Vernez (1997); Smith et. al. (1998).

4 Sabagh and Bozorgmehr (1996).

5 Hill and Johnson (2002).

6 Bozorgmehr, et al., 1996.

7 This section relies primarily on the excellent analysis of Allen and Turner (1997).

8 It is well documented that immigrants tend to concentrate residentially in order to take advantage of social networks that provide the social and economic support needed to adjust to a new environment, find housing and procure a job. Over time, as these immigrants and/or their children improve their economic situation and marry outside the community, these “enclaves” wither away unless they are continuously replenished with new arrivals, as is the case in the region.

9 Hill and Johnson (2002) warn, however, that fertility rates notoriously fluctuate and that the fertility rate of U.S.-born Hispanic women is about one-third lower than that of foreign-born Hispanic women. A moderate change in fertility rate can significantly alter the speed at which this process may take place.

10 McCarthy and Vernez (1997). The fact that fewer native-born were employed in 1997 than in 1990 in the California economy and were replaced by immigrants does not imply a one-to-one displacement. California is an open economy and during the recessionary years many more native-born left the state to work elsewhere than came into the state. Also, retirements among native-born appear to have exceeded new entrants into the economy.


12 California’s employment grew 42 percent and 32 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, while the rest of the nation grew by 29 and 17 percent. Although California’s loss of jobs during the first half of the 1990s recession exceeded that of the rest of the nation, employment again grew faster in California than the rest of the nation during the subsequent five years: 17 vs. 12 percent (McCarthy and Vernez (1997).

13 McCarthy and Vernez (1997).

14 McCarthy and Vernez (1997); Waldinger and Bozorghmer (1996); Aponte (1996). One exception has been reported noting increased competition and tensions between Mexican and Central American immigrants in the Los Angeles garment factories (Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1997).


16 Light and Roach (1996).

17 Bozorgmehr et. al. (1996); Portes and Zhou (1992).

18 Arguably, immigrants are also over-represented in the informal economy that thrives within well-developed immigrant enclaves avoiding tax and labor regulations. Most informal activities are relatively small, however (Portes (1998); Teige (1990); Stepik (1989).


20 There is a growing consensus that wages of native-born have been reduced by an estimated 1.5 to 2.5 percent nationwide at the level of immigration prevailing in the 1980s and 1990s (National Research Council (1997); McCarthy and Vernez (1997); Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997); Friedberg and Hunt (1995); Alton and Card (1991).

21 National research Council (1997); Cara (1996); Ong and Valenzuela (1996).
23 National Research Council (1997); McCarthy and Vernez (1997); Borjas and Hilton (1995); DaVanzo et. al. (1994).
24 National Research Council (1997). Services considered include medical assistance, welfare, K-12 education, higher education, police and fire protection, transportation, libraries, public health, public works, and general government assistance.
25 Such concerns are captured in statements such as the following: “The immigrants of today aren’t like the immigrants of yesterday. They don’t want to be Americans (Miller, 1998, p.5) or “As a society, America's central interest lies in assimilating these immigrant families. This means more than having them join the economic mainstream. It also means that they think of themselves primarily as Americans. If the United States simply becomes a collection of self-designated minorities, then the country will have changed for the worse” (Samuelson, 2001).
26 The decision to become a citizen represents formal acknowledgment of an immigrant’s acceptance of American identity. It is also a necessary step for full participation in the state and the nation’s democratic institutions. To naturalize, an immigrant must have resided continuously for five years in the United States and meet minimal English language requirements and demonstrate minimal knowledge of American history and democratic institutions. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform in 1997 recommended that these requirements be strengthened, but Congress has yet to act. Under the principle of Jus Solis, all persons born in the United States, including native-born children of foreign-born parents, are automatically granted U.S. citizenship.
27 For these immigrants, physical proximity allows for more frequent visits and contacts with the home country and may keep alive the hope of someday returning. Mexico’s law prohibiting land ownership for foreign nationals also may have deterred Mexican immigrants from naturalizing in the past.
28 Departing from previous practices, the Clinton administration’s active involvement in encouraging and facilitating the naturalization of immigrants on the eve of the 1996 presidential election was seen by some as a partisan attempt to increase and cultivate the Hispanic vote for the Democratic Party.
29 Public Agenda (2002).
30 This share exceeds that of traditionally polyglot New York (29 percent) and is three times the national average (Smith et.al., 1997).
32 Public Agenda (2003). Currently, more than 30 percent of children in the region’s K-12 schools are classified as English Learners (EL) (Tafoya, 2002).
33 DeSipio (1996).
35 For instance, Hispanics voted 82 percent in favor of Proposition BB School Bond Initiative compared with 76 percent of African Americans and 67 percent of non-Hispanic white voters.
36 DeSipio (1996); Miller (1998). The most visible example of ethnicity playing a major role at the local level is the Tammany Hall Irish of New York City in the early 20th Century that voted overwhelmingly for democrats.
37 Unlike in the first half of the 20th Century, post-1960s Civil Rights legislation and amendments provide incentives to maintain ethnic distinctiveness to maintain and gain preferential treatment (Fuchs, 1990; Glazer, 1993; Miller, 1998). Skerry (1993) argues that today’s Mexican-American leaders are pursuing such a strategy to maintain or gain preferential treatment. Diversity has become more valued today than it was in earlier times.
38 A recent example is the candidacies of Becerra and Villagairosa for Mayor of Los Angeles.
39 De la Garza, et.al. (1992); DeSipio (1993).
40 For instance, schools and health care were top priorities for Salvadorans and Guatemalans surveyed in Los Angeles by the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute (Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1998).
Dr Pachon, President of the Tomas Rivera Institute has said that 12 percent of Hispanic immigrants marry non-Hispanics and that by the third generation more than 50 percent do so (Los Angeles Times, Monday, February 17, 2003, p.A13).


Vila (1993). Roberts (1995) argues, however, that group identity remains strong among immigrant groups that see themselves as politically and culturally in exile such as Jewish, Irish, and more recently Cuban immigrants. The expectation of returning to their place of origin supports a co-ethnic cohesion based on a sense of cultural exile.

Los Angeles Times, May 4, 1993, commentary. Joe Hicks has been the executive Director of the Los Angeles City Human Relations Commission and Angela E. Oh was a member if President Clinton’s Initiative on Race.

Grogger and Trejo (2002) estimate that wages of the second generation of Mexican Americans are 35 percent higher than the wages of Mexican immigrants.

Schoeni et.al. (1996); Ortiz (1996); Waldinger (1996); McCarthy and Vernez (1997).

Daly et. al., (2001) measured inequalities as the ratio between the top 25th percentile and the bottom 25th percentile of the income distribution.

Vernez, Krop, and Rydell (1999); Vernez and Krop (1999); and Vernez and Mizell (2001). Also, it is well established that the level of education attained by parents and the level of family resources available explain most of the difference in educational attainment between individuals. In addition, more than two out of every five students in the region are identified as having only limited English language skills (Tafoya, 2002).

Schiller (1996).

Smith (1997).


Roberts (1995); Smith (1997).

In Los Angeles alone, there are more than 200 Mexican Hometown Associations (HTA) that contribute to projects in communities of origin. They receive financial and technical support from the Mexican government. Some Mexican states match from two-to-one to three-to-one the contributions made by HTAs (Mexican Hometown Associations, March 2003).

Prior to this law, U. S. naturalized Mexican immigrants lost their Mexican citizenship. Under the new law, U.S. naturalized immigrants were given five years to apply for Mexican nationality. Some 30,000 eligible Mexican origin immigrants had applied by the deadline, which then was extended indefinitely in 2003 by the Mexican Congress. Mexican nationals, unlike Mexican citizens, are not are not allowed to vote in Mexican elections. However, the law is ambiguous enough to be subject to interpretation and it is expected that this privilege will eventually be extended to Mexican nationals.

This unilateral action by the Mexican government is controversial. The acceptance of these cards by public agencies is subject to local and state legislative action. However, bank and other private entities are not similarly limited. Reportedly, the card is now being accepted by 74 banks, 800 local law enforcement agencies, and 13 states (Dinerstein, 2003). The California legislature is considering a bill that would require all state and local agencies to accept the matricula consular for ID purposes. El Salvador is now considering following the example of Mexico and provide matricula consular to its citizens in the United States as well.


Public Agenda (2002).

Keely (1995). The increase in the targeting of ethnic foreign donors in the last two presidential elections has become the center of controversy over the potentially inappropriate foreign influence on U.S. policy-making.


Johnson (2002) shows that the fertility rate for women of Mexican origin in the United States exceeds the fertility rate of Mexican women in Mexico.

The publication in 1994 by the Los Angeles Times of a photograph showing a sea of Mexican flags held by participants to a rally protesting Proposition 187 lent credence to such a perception.

Those concerned about this claim often refer to a statement attributed to Mario Obledo, Founder of the Mexican American Legal defense and Education Fund (MALDEF): “California is going to be a Mexican state, we are going to control all the political institutions. If people don’t like it, they should leave.” (Quoted in Matt Hayer, The Stealth Amnesty, http://www.FoxNews.com.)

Schoeni et.al. (1996); McCarthy and Vernez (1997).

Vernez and Mizell (2002).

First generation immigrants typically assess their economic and social well being relative to what it would have been had they remained in their country of origin and in this respect Mexican immigrants in the United States see themselves to be better off and satisfied (Public agenda, 2002). In contrast, their children will assess their situation relative to their counterparts in the United States and may not be satisfied if their job and economic opportunities remain limited.

Reviewing surveys of Mexican-Americans and Mexican immigrants spanning some 20 years, de la Garza and DeSipio (1998) conclude that their political loyalty to Mexico is low. A majority is reportedly more concerned with U.S. politics than with Mexican politics. In particular, few Mexican-Americans follow Mexican political events. Major concerns about Mexico include corruption, the economy and jobs, and drug trafficking.

For instance, of the 850,000 new jobs created by the Los Angeles county economy between 1980 and 1990, only 32,000 were filled by workers with a high school only or lower education. Although this does not mean that there are no jobs openings for less educated workers because of retirements and people changing jobs, it does indicate that job opportunities for less educated workers will be limited.

It is estimated that California’s college-age population alone may increase by 20 to 30 percent over the next decade. Increasing the college enrollment rate at the same time will further require increasing the capacity of the state’s post-secondary institutions.

This is not to suggest that the preservation of one’s individual or group culture, ethnic identity, and/or language should not be valued. It recommends, however, that the public, as opposed to private, emphasis should be placed on the shared values and characteristics.


Grogger, Jeffrey and Stephen T. Trejo. *Falling Behind or Moving Up?: The Intergenerational Progress of Mexican Americans.* Public Policy Institute of California, 2002.


Vernez, Georges, and Alan Abrahamse. *How Immigrants Fare in U.S. Education*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-718-AMF, 1996


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